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Abstract
This paper interfaces a specific theory of socialisation, derived from Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s influential book The Social Construction of
Reality, with the empirical story of Muslim settlement in Britain. It makes a
key distinction between the primary socialisation experiences of immigrants,
which unfolded in their countries of origin, and that of their diaspora-born
offspring whose identity is forged between an inherited ethno-religious culture
and the wider British collective conscience. Drawing on extensive ethnographic
fieldwork conducted with the Islamic revivalist movement Tablighi Jama’at, the
paper explores the cultural embodiments of religion as it evolves over genera-
tions through an examination of identity markers such as language, dress and
food. The analysis triangulates Berger and Luckmann’s concepts of primary and
secondary socialisation with a tripartite model of British Muslim identity de-
veloped by Ron Geaves. It further argues, in light of Kwame Gyekye’s theory
of nation-building, that recent government efforts to promulgate a set of
fundamental British values in schools represent an essentially Durkheimian
attempt to supply the ‘social glue’ that binds citizens together. While the article
acknowledges the increasing salience of religion for many British-born Mus-
lims, it argues for the ongoing influence of ethnicity and nationality in deter-
mining their lived experience.
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Introduction
In their influential treatise on the sociology of knowledge, Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann (1966) postulate a triangular dynamic in which human social
experience is mediated with reference to three distinct processes. First, meanings are
continually produced and externalised through a perpetual motor of inescapable human
activity. Secondly, they are objectivated as they sediment into institutions and traditions
which reify over time into entities sui generis—constellations of monolithic meaning
that impose themselves upon groups of human actors; though, crucially, they remain
dependent upon those same human actors for their ongoing production. Lastly, they are
internalised through ongoing processes of socialisation in which the now taken-for-
granted suppositions of the culture in question penetrate the subjective consciousness of
new generations of children or newcomers to the social order who, in the case of
thoroughly socialised individuals, can imagine no other way of being. This tripartite
conceptualisation has its roots in the origins of sociology as such and attempts a
synthesis between classical Durkheimian notions of the objective facticity of society
and Weber’s contrary emphasis on Verstehen. Though the above theoretical system
was developed in reference to a generic sociology of knowledge, Berger (1967) later
applied it specifically to religion, transforming the ‘symbolic universe’ advanced in his
work with Luckmann into The Sacred Canopy.
Drawing on this theoretical model, this paper proposes a framework for understand-
ing the social construction of British Muslim identity. It particularly focusses on Berger
and Luckmann’s third process, namely that of internalisation through means of both
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ socialisation into a given Weltanschauung. Socialisation is
defined as follows:
…the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective
world of a society or a sector of it. Primary socialization is the first socialization
an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of
society. Secondary socialization is any subsequent process that inducts an already
socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society.
(Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 150)
The latent power of socialisation thus depends upon the existence of social worlds
whose meanings have already sedimented into tradition through prior processes of
externalisation and objectivation and which impose themselves—with differing levels
of intensity—upon human consciousness as external facticity. These worlds of mean-
ing, however, are radically different between societies, in terms of both their substan-
tive content and their cultural expressions. This is significant when considering the
socialisation experiences of immigrants and their offspring. This paper therefore
interrogates the intersection of a specific theory of socialisation with the empirical
story of Muslim settlement in Britain. It makes a key distinction between the primary
socialisation experiences of immigrants, which unfolded in their countries of origin,
and that of their diaspora-born offspring whose identity is forged between an inherited
ethno-religious culture and the wider British collective conscience. By deploying a
sociological approach, the paper does not focus on intellectual or theological attempts
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to reconcile Islam with Western modernity (as exemplified, say, in the works of Tariq
Ramadan or Khaled Abou El Fadl), but rather captures an on-the-ground cultural
efflorescence through a fine-grained ethnographic lens. While Berger and
Luckmann’s work has been one of the most influential in twentieth century
sociology,1 this paper—to the author’s knowledge—is the first application of it
to theorise the construction of immigrant and post-immigrant identity in a specific
religious minority group.
The paper arises inductively out of ethnographic fieldwork conducted with the
British branch of the international Islamic revivalist movement, the Tablighi Jama’at
(TJ). My specific concern in this fieldwork was to examine intergenerational transmis-
sion within male members of the movement in Britain. The longevity of the move-
ment’s presence in the UK, its appeal to multiple generations of British Muslims and
the distinct nature of its mosque-based activism which brings ‘elders’ and ‘youngsters’
together in a closed space makes it a particularly useful case study of intergenerational
transmission. A total of 59 interviews were conducted with both first-generation
migrants and their British-born counterparts. These spanned a spectrum of experience
from seasoned veterans, with decades of devoted TJ service, to occasional youthful
participants, ex-members and critics. As part of my fieldwork, I also participated in a
wide range of Tablighi activities. This included, most significantly, joining numerous
khuruj outings—a term which refers to the movement’s emblematic mosque-based
retreats—that saw me travel to various towns and cities in the UK and undertake a
prolonged 42-day road trip to Bulgaria with a British TJ group. While the paper draws
upon data generated during these fieldwork experiences, the theoretical infrastructure it
proposes seeks to transcend them by undergirding British Muslim identity more
generally. As such, the paper is squarely located in the sociology of Muslim commu-
nities in Britain.
The paper consists of seven sections. In the first, I elaborate in generic terms ways in
which religious identities are transmitted to children through the process of ‘primary
socialisation’ and explore why intergenerational transmission of Islam in the UK has
been more successful than other religions. In the second, I deploy Durkheim to sketch
some contours of a contemporary British ‘collective conscience’—with specific refer-
ence to declining national and religious identities and a rising tide of
individualisation—which underpins heterogeneous spheres of society in which pro-
cesses of ‘secondary socialisation’ unfold. In the third, I apply the processes of primary
and secondary socialisation to the horizontal immigration of Muslims into Britain, and
distinguish their experiences from that of Western converts, by triangulating Berger and
Luckmann’s work with Ron Geaves’ conceptual distillation of British Muslim identity
into the discrete categories of ethnicity, religion and nationality. In the fourth, fifth and
sixth sections, I examine the vertical transmission of an ethno-religious Muslim identity
across generations in Britain through an ethnographic exploration of cultural identity
markers such as language, food and dress; and also explicate the sociological mechan-
ics through which ‘intra-religious conversion’ occurs among TJ neophytes. Lastly,
drawing upon Kwame Gyekye’s theory of nation-building, I interpret the British
government’s enunciation of a set of fundamental British values to be mandatorily
1 See, for instance, the 2016 special issue of the journalCultural Sociologywhich celebrated the book’s fiftieth
anniversary.
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enacted in schools as an essentially Durkheimian attempt—especially in light of the
widespread fracturing of national and religious identities—to supply the ‘social glue’
that binds citizens together. The paper concludes that British Muslim identity should
best be viewed as a cultural mélange or disorderly bricolage that draws simultaneously
from multiple sources and which manifests differently under the pressure of different
situations.
Primary socialisation and Muslim nurture
Primary socialisation is the key process through which a child attains a self-conception
of identity and learns to behave in the world. It massively and decisively determines the
development of subjective consciousness since it is administered through the emotion-
ally charged medium of ‘significant others’, usually parents, who necessarily develop
strong bonds of intimacy with the growing child.2 In the formative early years, the child
progressively appropriates into the domain of interior consciousness the configurations
of meanings taken for granted by those closest to him/her. As such, he/she steadily
begins to reproduce the values which have been imbibed. There is a sense of haphaz-
ardness here (the child would think and behave differently had he or she been raised by
different significant others) as also inevitability. In this regard, it is worth quoting
Berger and Luckmann at length:
Every individual is born into an objective social structure within which he
encounters the significant others who are in charge of his socialization. These
significant others are imposed upon him. Their definitions of his situation are
posited for him as objective reality … Since the child has no choice in the
selection of his significant others, his identification with them is quasi-automatic.
For the same reason, his internalization of their particular reality is quasi-inevi-
table. The child does not internalize the world of his significant others as one of
many possible worlds. He internalizes it as the world, the only existent and only
conceivable world, the world tout cort. It is for this reason that the world
internalized in primary socialization is so much more firmly entrenched in
consciousness than worlds internalized in secondary socializations. However
much the original sense of inevitability may be weakened in subsequent disen-
chantments, the recollection of a never-to-be-repeated certainty – the certainty of
the first dawn of reality – still adheres to the first world of childhood. (Berger and
Luckmann 1966, pp. 151, 154–155)
It is for this reason that religious identities firmly transmitted to children by significant
others during this formative period have a high probability of persisting throughout the
individual’s life. This assertion is substantiated by a wide range of studies in multiple
international contexts, some longitudinal, which taken together reinforce the almost
2 Berger and Luckmann’s theoretical system relies here on the work of George Herbert Mead from whom they
derive their concepts of primary and secondary socialisation as well as significant and generalised others.
Other influences include Piaget, Cooley and Freud.
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axiomatic power of parental socialisation to embed worlds of meaning within the
consciousness of the growing child (Birkelbach and Meulemann 2013; Hayes and
Pittelkow 1993; Özdikmenli-Demir and Şahin-Kütük 2012; Stott 1988; van de Pol and
van Tubergen 2014). For example, McGuckin et al. (2009) examined the influence of
parents on the religiosity of children across ten countries. Of these, eight were described
as ‘at least nominally Christian samples’ (Germany, Poland, Great Britain, Croatia,
Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland), one Jewish (Israel) and one Muslim (Turkey).
The authors differentiated the term ‘religious socialisation’ into three distinct categories
depending on levels of parental involvement, i.e. ‘no religious socialisation’, ‘incidental
religious socialisation’, and ‘intentional religious socialisation’. Despite some national
variation, they found consistently across all ten countries that ‘Young people who were
offered religious socialisation by their parents are not only more religious than the
young people who did not receive religious socialisation, but they were more tradi-
tionally religious … Parental influence did not promote indiscriminate religiosity,
rather, it was likely to promote the religiosity of the parents.’
What are the mechanisms through which this operates in practice? Cornwall’s (1988)
study of twenty-seven Mormon congregations across the USA identified three ways in
which the family directly influence the religious identity formation of the growing child.
Firstly, parents supply a constellation of symbolic reference points for understanding the
world and the role of human beings within it—transmitted, usually, through stories or
‘grand narratives’. These provide the primary building blocks with which the child first
engages in the process of meaning-making. Secondly, parents model religious behaviour
through their own practice of a given religious tradition. The growing child thus observes,
and progressively participates in, the rites and rituals considered proper for that religious
reference group and comes to adopt, in the case of successful socialisation, an appropriate
sense of existential comportment. Lastly, parental authority functions to channel the social
interaction of the child into networks of association that corroborate the religious teaching
administered within the home. Friendship choices and engagement with external spheres
are thus constrained, for example, to contacts within the church community who share the
same faith and indirectly consolidate the reference points of the symbolic universe posited
by the family (cf. Berger’s (1967, pp. 45–51) concept of ‘plausibility structures’).
Collaboratively, these mechanisms function to embed decisively within the consciousness
of the growing child a set of meanings which intertwine deeply and intimately with their
sense of self.
There is evidence to suggest that these processes pertain particularly to the
formation of Muslim identity. Data generated from the 2003 Home Office Citi-
zenship Survey found that rates of religious transmission are higher among
Muslims than any other UK religious group. Analysis of data collected across
three generations (parents’ religious upbringing, parents’ current level of religious
practice, children’s identification with a religion) demonstrates that rates of inter-
generational religious attrition are highest among Christians, 38.3% of whom no
longer identify with their ancestral religion by the third-generation. By contrast,
97.7% of third-generation Muslims continue to identify with Islam as do 88.9% of
the third-generation belonging to other UK religions.3 A detailed exploration of
3 This should not obscure an increasing trend of ‘de-conversion’ among Western Muslims as documented
by Cottee (2015).
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why this should be the case was undertaken by Scourfield et al. (2013) who
conducted a qualitative study of 60 Muslim families with primary school age
children (interviews conducted with 99 parents and 120 children) in Cardiff.
Scourfield et al. (2013) identified four key mechanisms through which religious
identity is internalised by Muslim children raised in Britain. First, cognitive transmis-
sion—based on Harvey Whitehouse’s doctrinal mode of religiosity—appertains partic-
ularly to the ritualistic nature of mainstream Sunni Islamic praxis (the five daily prayers
or frequent recitations of prophetic litanies being two examples). Second, embodiment
and habitus—rooted in the differing conceptions of Pierre Bourdieu and Saba
Mahmood (who, unlike Bourdieu, hearkens back to an earlier conceptualisation of
habitus as ‘ethical cultivation’ based on Aristotle)—refers to the way inward disposi-
tions are nurtured through a range of micro-level socialisations including childhood
religious ceremonies, parental choices relating to naming and dress or the display of
material religion in the fabric of the home. Third, minority defence refers to the
conflation of religious and minority ethnic identities vis-à-vis a majority culture that
can sometimes be hostile or discriminatory. Lastly, religious organisations and con-
gregations play a key role in providing a broader network of social confirmation for
core ethno-religious values imbibed in the home. In particular, the hundreds of Islamic
supplementary schools (makatib) operating out of mosques across the UK are instru-
mental here. In practice, these four mechanisms overlap and interplay in the child’s
lived experience to produce a deeply rooted religious (and ethnic cultural) identity:
(Scourfield et al. 2013, p. 205)
All of the above relates to the primary socialisation administered by caregivers in the
home and bolstered through extended networks of social and family contacts that
collectively reinforce the child’s immediate Weltanschauung; as such, it substantiates
in several important ways the salience of the ‘direct transmission model’ identified by
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Knott and Lee (2017) in their wide-ranging survey of academic literature on The
Family and Ideological Transmission. Successful socialisation could be said to occur
when the child perceives as essential to his/her own subjective identity those core
values which constitute the meaning-system of the group in which he/she was raised:
‘He now has not only an identity vis-à-vis this or that significant other, but an identity in
general, which is subjectively apprehended as remaining the same no matter what
others, significant or not, are encountered’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 153). This
latter point is important as it introduces the idea that primary socialisation is not
conclusive and the individual, as he/she progresses through life, will become attached
to new significant others and encounter a range of alternate meaning-systems that may
well contradict or undermine the substantive content internalised in that admittedly
powerful and nostalgic ‘first dawn of reality’.4
Secondary socialisation and the contemporary British collective
conscience
In relatively simple, pre-modern societies (the tribe or village—akin to Durkheim’s
concept of ‘mechanical solidarity’), it can be surmised that a basic correspondence
existed between the core content of the values internalised during primary socialisation
and those of the necessarily limited wider society. The more complex, differentiated
scenario of advanced or post-industrial societies (more akin to Durkheim’s notion of
‘organic solidarity’) is different. From the outset, globalisation reaches into individual
homes and collaborates with parents to inject into local meaning-systems the values of
a ‘McWorld culture’ disseminated through the mass media of television and the
Internet (Barber 2011 [1995]). The child, as he/she progresses through adolescence,
is increasingly exposed to new social worlds outside of the home. Peer groups
congregate around shared constellations of meaning which may well fly in the face
of parental expectations (‘Don’t worry mum, we’re revising!’ texts Jenny as her friend
shoots heroin into her arm). The Durkheimian division of labour integral to modern
societies sets up multiple arenas of activity each of which requires specialised knowl-
edge and training (Durkheim 1984 [1933]). Getting a new job thus demands successful
socialisation into a new world with its attendant uniform, protocol and lingo. Over the
course of a lifetime, an individual may thus be re-socialised numerous times, yet each
of these experiences of secondary socialisation build upon, rather than displace or
obviate, the foundational experience of primary socialisation: ‘The ‘sub-worlds’
4 It is worth pointing out here, in passing, that the vehement ‘NewAtheism’ of recent years considers any form
of pre-pubescent religious instruction to be child abuse. For instance, ‘How could any decent person think it
right to label four-year-old children with the cosmic and theological opinions of their parents?… Our society,
including the non-religious sector, has accepted the preposterous idea that it is normal and right to indoctrinate
tiny children in the religion of their parents…’ (Dawkins 2006, pp. 380–381). Or ‘The obsession with
children, and with rigid control over their upbringing, has been part of every system of absolute authority
… If religious instruction were not allowed until the child had attained the age of reason, we would be living in
a quite different world’ (Hitchens 2007, p. 376). These excerpts seem to overlook the basic fact that
socialisation cannot take place in a vacuum but is necessarily freighted with the cultural and cognitive
assumptions of the significant others. After all, would Dawkins and Hitchens themselves carefully resist the
temptation of extolling the virtues of atheism or indulging in their usually caustic denigrations of religion
within earshot of their own young and impressionable children?
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internalized in secondary socialization are generally partial realities in contrast to the
‘base-world’ acquired in primary socialization’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 158).
Put differently, a range of software packages can be downloaded onto the hardware
machinery of a single computer.
While the sub-worlds of office, college and heroin den may differ qualita-
tively in nature, each operates within the parameters of a ‘symbolic universe’—
defined as ‘…bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of
meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality…’ (Berger
and Luckmann 1966, p. 113)—which supplies the materials for a broad social
consensus in relation to their activities. In its most basic function as a nomic
legitimation of diverse human activity, the symbolic universe supplies the
reservoir of meanings by which a promotion is celebrated, a flunked exam
rued and an addict decried as a reckless reprobate. Emile Durkheim’s concept
of the ‘collective conscience’ is relevant here.5 Defined as ‘…a body of beliefs,
practices and collective sentiments which are … diffused throughout the soci-
ety, define social purposes, give meaning to action and generally structure the
pattern of social life’ (Morrison 1995, p. 131), Durkheim characterises the
collective conscience as a homogenising force which provides the basic animus
of a society through four interrelated elements. First, the volume of the collec-
tive conscience refers to its pervasiveness and its ability to envelop individual
members. Second, its intensity refers to its ability to penetrate individual consciousness
shaping thought and behaviour. Third, its determinateness refers to its firmness and
durability measured by its ability to absorb transgressions or incipient rumblings of
change. Lastly, its content can be either religious or secular, the former deriving its
authority from ecclesiastical authorities or scripture and the latter from political, economic
or scientific social apparatus sanctioned through a restitutive system of law (see Morrison
1995, 131–133). In societies of mechanical solidarity, the collective conscience was
strong, pervasive and religious in character functioning as the ‘social glue’ that bound
people together. In more modern societies of organic solidarity, however, ‘The collective
conscience becomes a diffuse, abstract ‘cult of the individual’ that, as a civil religion,
supplies ultimate principles and justifications but cannot bear the whole weight of social
cohesion’ (Scott 2014, p. 95). The reference to civil religion is apposite:
…in advanced industrial societies, which are increasingly secular in terms of
institutional religions, civic [sic] religions (such as the celebration of the state or
civil society) now serve the same functions of prescribing the overall values of
society, providing social cohesion, and facilitating emotional expression. In other
words, civil religions offer a ‘functional equivalent’ or ‘functional alternative’ to
institutional religions, since they meet the same needs within the social system.
(Scott 2014, p. 78)
The social conditions of contemporary Britain reflect a differentiated, ‘weak’
collective conscience which, in practice, exhibits features of civil religion
5 The same concept is sometimes referred to as the ‘conscience collective’ or ‘collective consciousness’.
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particularly when juxtaposed to the decline of traditionally strong religious and
national identities. As such, ‘functional alternatives’ such as football or the
monarchy thrive (Moreton 2010). The cumulative impact of industrialisation
and secularisation in weakening the historically Christian fabric of the nation
have been well-documented and, while Anglicanism remains England’s official
state religion, core processes of ‘structural and functional differentiation’ have
situated religion principally within the private sphere (Bruce 2002; Casanova
1994, pp. 40–66). According to Callum Brown, the 1960s was the definitive
decade in which religious observance saw a precipitous decline in Britain. As
he dramatically puts it:
For over a thousand years, Christianity penetrated deeply into the lives of
the [British] people, enduring Reformation, Enlightenment and the indus-
trial revolution … Then, really quite suddenly in 1963, something very
profound ruptured the character of the nation and its people, sending
organised Christianity on a downward spiral to the margins of social
significance. In unprecedented numbers, the British people since the
1960s have stopped going to church, have allowed their church member-
ship to lapse, have stopped marrying in church and have neglected to
baptise their children … Since then, a formerly religious people have
entirely forsaken organised Christianity in a sudden plunge into a truly
secular condition. (Brown 2001, p. 1)
A Church of England report on the faith of under 30s in Britain, termed
‘Generation Y’, similarly found that ‘only one in two believes in God (lower
than the national average), that levels of religious observance are very low, and
that the overwhelming feeling is one of disinterest and disengagement’ (Spencer
2010). While Grace Davie’s studies of religion in Britain and Europe have
popularised the terms ‘believing without belonging’ and ‘vicarious religion’ to
mitigate prior unilinear conceptions of the secularisation process (Davie 2000,
1994), the second edition of her acclaimed Religion in Britain continues to
demonstrate a steady decline in statistical indices of religious observance (Davie
2015, pp. 41–67). It came as little surprise then when, sometime around 2015,
Britons self-identifying as ‘no religion’ outnumbered Christians to become a
new cultural majority (Woodhead 2016).
Anderson (1983), in his classic work Imagined Communities, suggests that
nationalism—or strong patriotic fervour—is a peculiarly modern phenomenon
that emerges partly in response to the decline of traditionally religious systems
of belief. It therefore functions to supply symbols of unity and solidarity (such
as the flag) as a type of surrogate religion. While this may have been true for
Britain during much of the twentieth century, especially during the emotionally
tense periods of the two World Wars, narratives of national identity, like
religion, have more recently been in decline with the strong pride of an
imperial past giving way to more nebulous and fragmented notions of British-
ness (Fox 2004). An IpsosMORI (2007), p. 4) survey on British identity
conducted with 16–21-year olds found ‘a fundamental lack of emotional
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resonance amongst young people with the concept of Britishness … For many
young people Britain represents an old, hierarchical, traditional, political dis-
course that does not fit with the fresh, inventive, messy and often chaotic world
of a teenager.’ Globalisation, immigration and the increasing ‘technologisation’
of culture all play key roles here:
In a country that is now a container of African and Asian cultures, the sense of
what it is to be British can never again have the same confidence and surety… Is
it at all possible, in global times, to regain a coherent and integral sense of
identity? Continuity and historicity of identity are challenged by the immediacy
and intensity of global cultural confrontations. The comforts of Tradition are
fundamentally challenged by the imperative to forge a new self-interpretation…
(Robins 1991, p. 40)
This ‘imperative to forge a new self-interpretation’ indicates a key shift towards
individualisation in modern societies, in which a ‘wider cultural ‘turn to the
self’’ combines with a consumerist ‘culture of choice’ (Woodhead and Heelas
2000, p. 345) to produce, in José Casanova’s (1994, p. 53) terms, ‘the cult of the
individual [which] has indeed become, as foreseen by Durkheim, the religion of
modernity.’
Migration and the formation of British Muslim identity
between primary and secondary socialisations
This attempt to adumbrate some contours of the British collective conscience is
important as it represents the broader social milieu into which Scourfield
et al.’s (2013) Muslim child, having experienced a stronger-than-average pro-
gramme of cultural and religious nurture, will progressively emerge. In essence,
all of the individual’s experiences of both primary and secondary socialisation
unavoidably take place within this broader social milieu which to a lesser or
greater extent influences them—particularly if, as a third-generation Muslim
child, their parents were also born and raised in Britain. First-generation
migrants, however, approach British society from a very different standpoint
to their diaspora-born offspring, and it is to their experiences that we now turn.
A stark fact of British Islam is germane here: the overwhelming extent to
which it is ensconced within antecedent and ongoing processes of immigration.
While early post-war migration in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was primarily
economically motivated and from former British colonies in South Asia, later
migration has been more diverse encompassing asylum seekers from countries
such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia or wealthy investors and skilled profes-
sionals from North Africa and the Middle East (Lewis 2007, pp. 19–21; Gilliat-
Ray 2010, pp. 44–53). This diversity in motivation and geography does not
occlude the core sociological fact that the primary socialisation of first-
generation migrants took place in a very different socio-cultural milieu from
the country to which they relocated. Consequently, upon arrival, they were
obliged to navigate a new set of cultural mores relating, inter alia, to the
340 Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:331–360
language, food, dress and religion of the newly adopted country. Given that the
substantive contents of both primary and a range of secondary socialisations
had already congealed in subjective consciousness prior to encountering the
new reality, a sense of emotional distance could well be expected from the new
culture whose collective conscience might appear alien and incomprehensible—
more so if exacerbated by incidents of racism or discrimination. This would
especially have been true for early South Asian migrants many of whom
formed, to use Tariq Modood’s memorable phrase, ‘a semi-industrialised, newly
urbanised working class community only one generation away from rural
peasantry’ (cited in Mandaville 2001, p. 123). In such a scenario, it is entirely
understandable why early arrivals, enduring together the uprooting dislocation
of migration and bound by shared cultural memories, sought comradeship in
each other and set about re-creating in the new context norms of life familiar
from the country of origin (Brown 2006).
Studies of Muslim settlement in Britain concur that the earliest post-war
arrivals were largely unskilled male workers who laboured under the presump-
tion of a ‘myth of return’ (Gilliat-Ray 2010; Ansari 2004; Anwar 1979). Changes
in immigration legislation in the 1960s and 1970s expedited the arrival of
women; the rudiments of community formation were thus initiated accompanied
by a conceptual shift, in the mind of the migrant, from sojourner to settler
(Lewis 2007, pp. 16–18). From the perspective of the sociology of knowledge,
this presented a very specific challenge, i.e. to generate in space and time and
maintain as plausible to subjective consciousness a sub-universe of meaning
lacking any social support. Berger’s (1967, pp. 45–51) concept of ‘plausibility
structures’ is relevant here which, in his collaboration with Luckmann, is
expressed as follows: ‘All socially meaningful definitions of reality must be
objectivated by social processes. Consequently, sub-universes require sub-
societies as their objectivating base, and counter-definitions of reality require
counter-societies’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 145). Put differently, any
religious group newly arrived in Britain—whether Neocatechumenate, Hare
Krishna or Soka Gakkai—should they wish to maintain fidelity to their pre-
immigration definitions of reality, must instantiate in space and time and en-
shrine in institutional constructs (as part of the first two processes of the tripartite
system outlined earlier, namely externalisation and objectivation) core elements
of their symbolic universe to prevent ‘cognitive liquidation’ into the dominant
structures of meaning which pervade the wider collective conscience. With
reference to the Tablighi Jama’at, construction of a large headquarters in Dews-
bury was completed in 1982 manned by dedicated personnel, and augmented by
regular teams of visiting TJ delegations, allowing the movement’s reality-
defining potential to steadily actualise. More generally, processes of mosque-
building, accompanied gradually by wider institutional infrastructures, gained
momentum from the 1970s, enabling an emergent British Islam to be
undergirded by a legitimating social apparatus.
Yet the religious identity of early migrants, as it took root and developed in
the new context, fused in important ways with an ethnic cultural one derived
from the countries of origin (Geaves 1996; Werbner 2002; Sardar 2008). It is
useful to distinguish here between three key pivots around which British
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Muslim identity could be said to revolve, i.e. ethnicity, nationality and religion.
While several scholars intimate this conceptual distinction (Mustafa 2015;
Ansari 2004; Bagguley and Hussain 2005), Ron Geaves, when considering
the legacy of the Victorian Muslim convert Abdullah Quilliam for young
Muslims today, reproduces from his earlier career the following diagram:
Ethnicity, nationality and religion in the construction of British Muslim identity
(Geaves 2010, p. 301).
Scions of the dominant culture who convert to Islam, such as Abdullah
Quilliam, may well find that elements of their ethnicity and nationality enmesh
intimately and unproblematically (Zebiri 2007; Jawad 2012). Put differently, the
transformation of meaning-system implicit to conversion does not affect the
pigmentation of one’s skin - nor, as Abd-allah (2004) points out, does it
necessitate cultural apostasy (though it may well moderate one’s patriotic fervour
(Gilham 2014), preclude participation in such ubiquitous aspects of the national
culture as regular pub attendance (see Fox 2004, p. 88) or be accompanied by a
level of enculturation into certain mores of Muslim-majority societies (Butt
2020)). In cases of deep and profound conversion however, termed ‘alternation’
by Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 176), the content of the meaning-system
implanted in subjective consciousness during the powerful experience of child-
hood primary socialisation must be substantially altered or displaced. This may
cause a rupture in terms of the individual’s self-conceptualisation of identity and
the efficacy of such a conversion often depends, in practice, upon the cultivation
of strong personal bonds forged with new significant others who mediate the
‘plausibility structure’ of the receiving group: ‘No radical transformation of
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subjective reality (including, of course, identity) is possible without such iden-
tification, which inevitably replicates childhood experiences of emotional depen-
dency on significant others. These significant others are the guides into the new
reality’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 177). The deeply reverential, paternal
relationship between the prominent American Muslim convert Shaykh Hamza
Yusuf and his Mauritanian teacher Shaykh Murabit al-Hajj provides a good
example of this (see al-Hajj and Yusuf 2001, pp. 1–5).
While an easy alliance between ethnicity and nationality also pertains in various
Muslim-majority contexts, it is thrown into disarray by the act of migration and the
concomitant transitioning of the individual into a minority community surrounded
by an alien host culture. Though legally naturalised citizens and co-religionists of
the numerically fewer converts to Islam, Muslim migrants from overseas have a
very different relationship with the British collective conscience. For them, it is the
conjunction of ethnicity and religion, indelibly wrought in consciousness through
processes of primary and secondary socialisation administered abroad, that consti-
tutes the principal matrix through which British culture is apprehended and
engaged.
Food, as an important marker of cultural identity, illustrates this point nicely.
While conducting fieldwork with both first-generation and British-born Tablighis, I
quickly realised that socialisation has a physiological dimension brought into sharp
relief by migration. Put differently, first-generation migrants quite literally taste food
differently to their British-born offspring—or indeed the wider population (Timol
2019). This became evident simply through observing the tea-drinking habits of my
respondents while on khuruj. Unlike their British-born counterparts who were gener-
ally comfortable with either, I found elderly migrants almost exclusively preferred
‘desi chai’—equal amounts of milk and water boiled on a stove with a teabag and
sometimes flavoured with spices—and usually looked askance at ‘English tea’ (hot
water from a kettle poured onto a teabag usually with a splash of milk). Indeed, on
one occasion, I heard an elderly British Pakistani scornfully dismiss English tea as no
more than ‘weak, flavoured water’. Such proclivities of the palate, as Geaves (1996)
argues more generally, were cultivated through processes of socialisation administered
abroad in which religion is usually internalised into subjective consciousness as an
intrinsic component of a broader ethnic culture. To illustrate this differently, biryani
and Jumu’ah namaz (the Friday prayer) might well appear to many first-generation
migrants as inseparable components of a single ethno-religious package uncritically
imbibed in the ancestral village while, in comparison, bangers and mash or the
Eucharist appear as exotic yet essentially irrelevant alternatives.
There is some evidence that the exigencies of immigration can reinvigorate religious
consciousness as the dislocation of the experience allows the continuity of a religious
identity to function as an anchor in the new society (Duderija 2008, pp. 372–373). This
certainly seems to have been a major attraction of the Tablighi Jama’at for early
migrants, as the movement’s regular retreats allowed the reproduction of key South
Asian cultural mores within the safe space of the mosque to generate a veritable ‘home
away from home’ in Britain (Sikand 1998). Meaning-systems and self-
conceptualisations of identity, however, are malleable and as fresh processes of sec-
ondary socialisation become activated in diaspora, some migrants may well learn to
navigate the new culture with remarkable degrees of success. The ‘rags to riches’ story
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:331–360 343
of Sir Anwar Parvez (Lewis 2007, pp. 16–17), or the important leadership role played
by Shaykh Dr. Zaki Badawi for British Muslims in the 1980s and 1990s (Gilliat-Ray
2010, pp. 57–58), provide good examples of this. Others though—such as Ebrahim
Bawa Rangooni as cited in Sikand (1998)—may cultivate oppositional identities and,
even after several decades in the country, continue to look askance at the strange
customs of the ungodly people they live among.6
The situation, of course, is different for their offspring. Their primary socialisation,
as explicated in detail above, takes place in Britain and their secondary socialisations
induce them, with varying degrees of assimilation, into the British collective conscience
(which in turn, with varying degrees of success, is internalised by them). Yet, the fact
that their socialising personnel, the biographically significant others with whom they
were domiciled in the formative early years, were themselves products of another
culture substantially impacts their crucial primary socialisation experience. Conse-
quently, as Penn and Lambert (2009) show, the immigrant’s child has a foot in multiple
worlds.
Language as a window into religion, ethnicity and national culture
Children of immigrants raised in diaspora draw upon multiple sources of cultural
capital when engaging, usually subconsciously, in the complex and messy process of
identity construction (Alba 2005; Penn and Lambert 2009; Hirsch 2018). It is useful to
draw here on Geaves’ tripartite conceptualisation of ethnicity, religion and nationality
again. While Geaves seems to give equal weighting to each of these constitutive
components, triangulating his model with Berger and Luckmann’s concepts of primary
and secondary socialisation helps to better gauge how identity is refracted across
generations. My argument here is that key elements of an ethno-religious identity are
internalised by British-born Muslims during their childhood primary socialisation—
indeed, as was asserted earlier, ethnic and religious identities often appear inseparable
in the consciousness of first-generation migrants who constitute the ‘socialising per-
sonnel’ or ‘significant others’ of the British-born generation. By contrast, Geaves’ third
component of nationality is appropriated most significantly during secondary
socialisations into heterogeneous spheres of the wider collective conscience.
This point may be illustrated through the prism of language. Ethnicity is manifested
in local dialects imported from countries of origin—Sylheti, Pashtu, Gujarati, Somali or
Kurdish for example— often internalised in childhood primary socialisation as ‘mother
tongues’. The national language, by contrast, refers to the dominant societal lingua
franca—English in Britain—learnt in secondary socialisation, if not primary. Finally,
the chief language of what Geaves terms ‘Quranic Islam’ is, of course, Arabic, though
this is usually mediated for South Asian Muslims through the auxiliary religious lingua
franca of Urdu—rote Arabic being taught in the maktab solely for liturgical purposes.
6 Fiction provides a rich repertoire of alternative trajectories. The desire to efface any incongruous or
embarrassing elements of one’s ethnic persona may lead to one acting ‘more royal than the king’ as typified
by Saladin Chamcha, the incorrigible Anglophile of Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses. Alterna-
tively, the cognitive dissonance generated when disparate systems of meaning simultaneously impinge upon
subjective consciousness can give rise to intense anxiety as exemplified in the biographical tale of Changez,
the Pakistani American soliloquist of Mohsin Hamid’s brilliantly ambivalent The Reluctant Fundamentalist.
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That most second-generation British-born Muslims are multilingual to some degree in
all these languages is usually taken to be axiomatic (Lewis 2007, p. 43), but what I wish
to argue here is that shifts in the particular weighting attributed to each language signals
a clear transition from first-generation to diaspora-born identities.
For example, a typical South Asian elderly migrant might speak Sylheti or Gujarati
in the home, Urdu at the mosque and a broken, and highly accented, English at the
supermarket checkout. By contrast, his British-born counterpart principally articulates
in fluent English in all three locations—the most significant exceptions perhaps being
when conversing with his (grand) parents in an (halting) ethnic tongue or other first-
generation elders at the mosque in either the ethnic tongue or (halting) Urdu. My
extensive interaction with members of the British Tablighi Jama’at over 18 months of
fieldwork unequivocally found that for a younger generation of activists, English has
substantially superseded the ethnic tongues internalised in childhood. This reflects a
more general shift among second-generation Muslims as wonderfully illustrated during
a weekend mosque retreat (khuruj) I joined in October 2013. The leader of the group
(amir) was a white-bearded elder—albeit one who spoke good English—while the bulk
of the participants consisted of British-born teenagers, mainly of Gujarati background,
who occasionally participated in Tablighi outings. During the morning study circle, we
broke out into a handful of smaller groups for around 20 min to practice correct
pronunciation of Qur’anic Arabic (tajweed). After we regrouped, the amir explained:
‘We should take out special time to learn tajweed because we often make mistakes
without realising. That’s because Arabic is not our mother tongue. Our mother tongue
is…’ Here, he paused expectantly; in my fieldnotes, I recorded the following: ‘Imme-
diately the youngsters said in chorus ‘English!’ at exactly the same moment he said
‘Gujarati’ - a beautiful symbol of the generational gap.’ This shift from ethnic tongues
to the national language is an unsurprising feature of the general stock of academic
knowledge on immigrant communities and their offspring. Alba, for instance, in his
study of North Africans in France, Turks in Germany and Mexicans in the USA found
that
Proficiency in the mainstream language is close to universal in the second
generation of all three groups, which is educated typically in the public schools
of the receiving society. Some loss of the mother tongue is also common,
especially since members of the second generation frequently prefer to speak
the mainstream language… In the U.S. but also in France, the second generation
pattern of ‘responding to their parents in the dominant language while under-
standing what the parents say in the mother tongue’ is well known... (Alba 2005,
p. 36)
This transition in language usage has been accompanied by a transition in attitudes.
Elderly Tablighis—as with ‘English tea’—might well express a certain disdain for the
English language—either, perhaps, to disguise a lack of proficiency, because of an
emotional attachment to the mother tongue or, as Sikand (1998) suggests, because they
see it as an inextricable symbol of the wider secular society they wish to save
themselves from. British-born Tablighis, by contrast, speak English as a taken-for-
granted component of their normative social reality. In this regard, Geaves (2010, p.
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301) notes that ‘…the second generation find themselves being drawn towards British
identity as a natural allegiance of birth and as a result of socialisation processes.’
Deploying Berger and Luckmann, as this article has done, allows us to nuance these
‘socialisation processes’ by distinguishing between primary and secondary
socialisations. Given the ubiquitousness of digital media in today’s world, an additional
point can be made: English—and an attendant constellation of cultural values—can
now be regularly accessed by toddlers on screens in the home via YouTube, Netflix or
the like, even if neither parent is fluent in the language. In fact, so pronounced has the
impact of the digital revolution become on the lived experience of modern youth that it
may plausibly constitute a disembodied site of ‘tertiary socialisation’ that cuts across
the traditional modalities of primary and secondary socialisation proposed by Berger
and Luckmann over 50 years ago.7
Coming home: ‘intra-religious conversion’ in contemporary Islam8
While such shifting dynamics of language usage apply to immigrant communities in
general, intergenerational transmission of religion, as has already been pointed out,
occurs more successfully among Muslims than other UK faith communities. A further
finding of the literature on Muslims in the West relates to the decoupling of religion
from ethnicity among the second generation (Jacobson 1997; Duderija 2008; DeHanas
2016). Mandaville expresses this clearly:
The younger generation of diasporic South Asian Muslims… often questions the
Islam of its parents, regarding the latter as tainted with the ‘local culture’ of the
subcontinent and therefore not ‘true’ Islam. This has in many cases prompted a
return by the younger generation to another point of origin, Muhammad’s
Medina, which it regards as a source of ‘pure’ Islam. (Mandaville 2001, p. 90)
The reasons for this are varied and may include the ‘double marginality’ of the
diaspora-born Muslim who finds himself unable to relate fully to either the ethnic
culture of his parents or the secular assumptions of the mainstream, the intensity of
public Islamophobia which, turtle-like, causes the diaspora-born Muslim to recede into
the defensive shell of religion, or the impact of various international crises involving
Muslim people that cause an ‘ummatic’ allegiance to be privileged over an ethnic or
national one (Geaves 1996; Parekh 2008; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Revivalist
movements developed overseas and transplanted into the UK can play an important
role in reinvigorating a specifically religious identity for second-generation Muslims
7 As Amir Saeed (2017, pp. 137–138) puts it: ‘For young people today, there is nothing ‘new’ about digital
media; for them, digital media has always existed. Whether accessing the Internet through a desktop computer
or connecting through short message services (SMS) via mobile phones, digital/electronic media are omni-
present in Western contemporary society. New media specialist and pioneer Howard Rheingold has argued
that ‘search engines have replaced libraries’ for young people in the digital age…’
8 By ‘intra-religious conversion’ is meant a shift from a nominal or lax religious identity to one in which
religion becomes central to the individual’s sense of self. This became a consistent motif of my interviews with
British Tablighis and, arguably, is the raison d’être of the movement.
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(Hamid 2015). Inge’s (2017) study of Salafi women in London, for example, found that
a commitment to the movement’s ideals occasioned lifestyle changes significant
enough to be warranted conversion. Similarly, my study of British-born Tablighi
men found that participation in the movement led to an intensification of religiosity
that often surpassed—and sometimes bewildered—that of their parents. An example of
this is Hafiz Raees, a 34-year-old science teacher from Blackburn who memorised the
Qur’an as a child at the behest of his parents.9 Yet, this was done rather mechanically,
he felt, and thus largely bereft of spirituality. It was only when he began to participate in
TJ voluntarily in his late teens that an ‘awakening’ of sorts was experienced:
So all these years I’d learnt the Qur’an but I didn’t know the significance … [or
have] any understanding that this is probably the biggest achievement of my life.
So that jama’at [TJ outing], sort of, brought this to town, it hit me, hit me quite
hard. That this religion is not just something that you go through the motions but
it’s something which you have to fully enter into and something which will …
change you in every way. So these 40 days were a real eye-opener, you know,
and like the proverb goes the eye of the heart was opened.
What is significant here is that Raees memorised the Qur’an as an extension of his
primary socialisation experiences, but subsequently drifted from the practice of his
faith—as many other respondents also reported. Yahya for example, today a devoted
Tablighi with a large beard and turban, described his upbringing to me as predomi-
nantly cultural rather than religious:
Most of my friends [at college] were Asian Muslims. So it was a strong Asian
identity, not very religious, very secular ... we were all very secular, but we were
Asians and we were Indians and we were Muslims … but we didn’t pray
regularly [laughs], and we weren’t really practising.
Conversion to TJ can then be conceptualised as a twin process of desocialisation and
resocialisation that proceeds concurrently in neophyte consciousness. Desocialisation
takes place from the taken-for-granted assumptions of the local subculture nestled
within the wider collective conscience—whose values, as was asserted earlier, are
rooted far less deeply in subjective consciousness and hence more easily
displaceable—while resocialisation occurs into the rituals, mores and meaning-
system of the group. The praxis through which this is achieved is khuruj, or consistent
mosque-based retreats, which extricate the neophyte from the day-to-day enmeshments
of ordinary life and thrust him, both physically and conceptually, into an alternative
world. The messages he hears here—and often the cultural idioms through which they
are delivered—can resonate in emotionally charged ways with the content of the
meaning-system first internalised as taken-for-granted reality during the powerful
experience of childhood primary socialisation. Unlike the journey of the convert to
Islam then, who was raised in a different religious and usually ethnic cultural milieu,
9 Raees is a pseudonym; all respondents have been anonymised in this paper.
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the inarticulate sense of being a Muslim implanted in consciousness during childhood
can function for the diaspora-born Muslim as the crucial substratum of a later ‘intra-
religious conversion’ subjectively experienced as a return to one’s biographical roots.
As Umar expressed this:
So then eventually … that seed started to grow again and … I came out [on
khuruj] one day, I decided. Well I didn’t decide, Allah takes you out depending
on your talab and your desire. So anyway I managed to come out and when I
started coming out one day, once a month it went well. Obviously, I didn’t go for
such a long period … but it was like basically coming back home, if you know
what I mean? You know, it’s like living away from where you live. You went
into another country and you come back and you’ll always have like a connection
to that place, do you know what I mean?
An interesting observation about my interview sample is that only six of the total (6/59)
were third-generation British-born Muslims, all of whom were young sympathisers
experimenting with the movement. In contrast, all the dedicated British-born Tablighis
I interviewed who were not converts to Islam (17/21) were second-generation children
of immigrants. This finding—as Voas and Fleischmann (2012, p. 538) also note about
Western-born Muslims more generally—flatly refutes Herberg’s (1955) classic thesis
of ‘third generation return’ based on his application of ‘Hansen’s Law’ to the situation
of immigrant religion in mid-century America: ‘What the son wishes to forget the
grandson wishes to remember.’ Not only does this indicate the extent to which
grassroots intergenerational transmission has successfully occurred in British TJ but,
more significantly, that the experiences of the next generation of Muslim youth are now
frequently mediated with reference to a British-born generation’s configurations of
cultural norms. As Mandaville (2001, p. 124) puts this, ‘What is crucial here is the
rendering of Islam in an idiom comprehensible to those Muslims who have grown up in
Western society and who possess certain Western norms in addition to Islam.’
My interview with Hanzalah nicely illustrated this cultural evolution of TJ over
generations. A highly devoted Tablighi who has undertaken ten separate four-month
khuruj outings to various international locations (our interview took place just after his
return from Argentina), he was also among the first of the diaspora-born generation to
acquire postgraduate education and has balanced his TJ activism with a successful
career as a senior accountant. His first experience with the Tablighi Jama’at on a
weekend khuruj in the late 1980s, however, was largely negative. As he described it to
me, ‘They were the first-generation as such, therefore the understanding of the chal-
lenges and issues that we see now – sex, drugs … rock and roll that sort of thing –
weren’t prevalent then… at the time I thought of it like oh, I don’t need this… it didn’t
really appeal to me.’ After a several year hiatus, Hanzalah participated in another
weekend khuruj in the early 1990s. This coincided with a wider influx of British-born
activists resulting in a very different experience:
One of the main things was the fact … you had British-born, English-speaking
guys leading the effort. So, you know, all the conversations were in English. The
ta’lim [study circle] was in English. The programmes were in English, so
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immediately, you know, you feel much more comfortable. The food was more in
line with what we were used to. Aksy was there so, you know, he was making all
sorts of stuff like, breakfast was wow, you know, never had a breakfast like this at
home, never mind! So I think it was the whole set-up, it was like someone had
just dragged it from a prehistoric era into the modern world.
Diaspora religiosity as a cultural mélange
In foregrounding their new-found religiosity though, the diaspora-born generation cannot—
nor, it seems, do they particularly want to—simply disavow their ethnic heritage. This was
aptly illustrated tomewhen, as part of my fieldwork, I participated in a continuous TJ khuruj
to Bulgaria for 42 days (Timol 2015). The group (jama’at) I joined was young (aged
between 27 and 35), entirely British-born and mainly of South Asian ethnic ancestry. Our
amir decided that, as a declaration of our good intentions, we would feed the entire
congregation in everymosque visited. This usually attracted 40–50 people and, interestingly,
the group’s ethnic heritage was implicated in the food offered as hospitality. The amir—
despite being of mixed race ethnicity himself (white Irish–Spanish and Gujarati)—would
proudly announce to the locals that the jama’atwas going to cookHindi ta’am (Indian food)
which usually transpired to be the famed Gujarati dish daar chaawal (spicy lentil curry
served on rice). Similarly, when purchasing supplies in Dewsbury prior to departure, the
jama’at procured several bags of the Indian savoury snack ‘Bombay Mix’. Yet, when
serving this, we quickly learnt it was far too spicy for the Bulgarian palate and—until the
amir explicitly instructed against offering it to locals telling the jama’at to instead eat it
themselves—several group members watched with great mirth the animated reactions of
surprised locals who had unwittingly tried some.
Such culinary choices indicate a sense of unconscious affiliation, even pride, with
aspects of the South Asian cultural ancestry group members shared. This was perhaps
accentuated by the fact the jama’atwas thrust into an entirely new socio-cultural setting
which caused elements of their own identity to be foregrounded. Further, the fact that
all Tablighi novitiates are required to undertake a continuous four-month khuruj to
South Asia, where the movement’s international headquarters are based, serves to
reconnect diaspora-born youth with their ethnic cultural heritage; indeed, many return
having become fluent in Urdu. More generally though, I would argue that the cultural
idioms of a particular ethnic heritage—which not infrequently function as the carriers
of religion—are indelibly stamped on an individual identity through the powerful
formative experience of primary socialisation. Hence, they ineluctably interweave with
the individual’s sense of self in ways that cannot easily be disregarded. Despite the
idealised vision of a de-territorialised, a-cultural Islam commonly associated with the
movement (Roy 2004), Inge’s fieldwork among British Salafis similarly found this to
be the case. Amina, for instance, a Salafi woman of Eritrean ethnicity, reflected:
I can’t see [myself] marrying any other cultural background guy. I don’t know, I
just, within myself, I love my culture as much as I love my din [religion] – of
Contemporary Islam (2020) 14:331–360 349
course, my din comes before my culture, but to me, I just – I wanna sit there with
my mother-in-law and, you know, do the traditional stuff. (Inge 2017, p. 201)
Dress, along with food and language, is another important marker of cultural identity. South
Asian ethnic dress codes differ depending on country of origin: the shalwar kameez is
emblematic of traditional Pakistani dress, kafni patloon or the kurta typical of Indians and
the lungi common among Bangladeshis. Each of these was imported into Britain by first-
generationmigrants but, just as ethnic tongues have largely been supplanted by English (and
a growing tendency to learn Arabic, I noted) among British-born Tablighis, changing dress
codes similarly indicate a shift, in terms of Geaves’ tripartite model ofMuslim identity, from
ethnicity to both nationality and religion.
A defining feature of the Tablighi Jama’at lies in its insistence on maintaining a
distinct Muslim identity through dress. Consequently, followers are often recognisable
by their flowing robes, turbans or hats which, along with growing the beard, become
outward symbols of an intra-religious conversion experience—an ensemble which jars
conspicuously with the taken-for-granted norms of the British collective conscience.
Yet, many Tablighis I interviewed are simultaneously secular-educated professionals
inhabiting disparate fields in society as accountants, architects, teachers, civil servants
or solicitors. Consequently, they would think nothing of wearing a suit and tie to work
and then changing into a robe and turban when attending the mosque in the evening. As
Hanzalah put this:
I’ve represented my firm in meetings all over the world. I go in a suit because I’m
traveling on company business, so I don’t have an issue. The company’s very
relaxed. I’m not too keen on wearing ties so they don’t have an issue with that
whatsoever. But obviously, I can’t take my beard off and put it away for four or
five days while I go on business.
When attending the mosque or participating in khuruj however, I noted that rather than the
specifically ethnic dress of their parents, British-born Tablighis could be seen eclectically
selecting from a much more cosmopolitan range of Islamic sartorial options. Light cotton
robes from Oman, formal collared gowns from Saudi Arabia, hooded jellabiya from
Morocco and new types of fashionable Islamic attire manufactured by British Muslim
designers catering for niche diaspora markets, such as Lawung10 or Al Faizan11, were all
popular among my respondents. This subtle shift indicates the supplanting of ethnic
identities by more global notions of Muslim selfhood. In the British context, this tendency
has perhaps been expedited by the ‘hyper-diversity’ of global cities such as London whose
multiple immigration flows allow vibrant intercultural exchange between numerous
Muslim ethnic groups jostling in close proximity.12
10 See https://www.lawungonline.com (accessed 3 July 2020)
11 See https://www.al-faizan.com/ (accessed 3 July 2020)
12 This cultural eclecticism is sometimes mirrored by an intellectual cosmopolitanism. For instance, during my
fieldwork in Bulgaria, I noticed that the amir of our British TJ group would frequently listen to Islamic lectures
on his headphones via an MP4 player before sleeping. Upon enquiry, he explained he was listening to the
American scholar Shaykh Hamza Yusuf who had considerably shaped his understanding of Islam over the
years.
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In contrast to a reductionist set of binaries which conceptualise identity in either/or terms
then, the empirical reality of British Muslim identity seems to be more accurately represent-
ed as a hybridised mélange or a disorderly bricolage of myriad identity markers manifested
distinctly under the pressure of different situations (Mandaville 2001, pp. 90–101). While
the salience of religion has clearly been foregrounded for many second-generation British
Muslims—particularly those affiliated with revivalist movements such as the Tablighi
Jama’at—I would argue that their lived experiences continue to be mediated by a
confluence of ethnic ancestry as well as the socio-cultural contexts in which their
secondary socialisations occur. In respect of the latter, such ubiquitous aspects of the
British collective conscience as J.K. Rowling’s series of Harry Potter books, and the
related films, contribute to shaping the worldview of young Muslims. This was memora-
bly driven home to me during 10 days of fieldwork I conducted with teenage college
students on a TJ khuruj to Bradford during their 2014 summer holidays. The khuruj started
at the movement’s European headquarters in Dewsbury, which provided many of the
youth with the opportunity to visit this landmark site and interact with the various elders
who manage its day-to-day affairs for the first time. During the subsequent stay in several
Bradford mosques, they humorously compared these elders with various teachers at
Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry. Hafiz Patel, the white-bearded spiritual
figurehead of TJ in theWest, was unanimously declared to be Professor Dumbledore—an
unqualified force of goodness, wisdom and benevolence. Another Dewsbury elder,
known for his strictness, was less graciously referred to as Severus Snape while a
particularly hairy one was assigned the nickname of Rubeus Hagrid.
Hybridisation, however, is a two-way street. While the wider British collective con-
science continually informs Muslim socialisation experiences as a kind of background
chorus across the various sub-worlds and generations, it remains, in line with the key
principles of Berger and Luckmann’s tripartite paradigm, simultaneously and continually
produced by human activity in toto. Consequently, the production and sedimentation of
ethno-religious meanings into a distinctive subculture, while inevitably absorbing into itself
elements of the wider collective conscience, simultaneously impacts the cultural contours of
that same collective conscience. Returning again to themotif of food as an important marker
of cultural identity, then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s comments about chicken tikka
masala (presumably, mostly halal) in a 2001 public speech are telling:
Chicken Tikka Massala is now a true British national dish, not only because it is the
most popular, but because it is a perfect illustration of the way Britain absorbs and
adapts external influences. Chicken Tikka is an Indian dish. The Massala sauce was
added to satisfy the desire of British people to have their meat served in gravy.13
13 See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/apr/19/race.britishidentity (accessed 3 July 2020). See also
Penn and Lambert (2009, p. 33).
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Manning the fort: fundamental British values and the social
construction of nation
In situations in which the collective conscience is weak—as I have argued it is in contem-
porary Britain given the twin fragmentation of religious and national identities—its
homogenising capacity is diminished as pockets of counter-cultural meaning are able to
establish themselves and fulfil the basic, essential function of anomalistic primary
socialisation with relative ease. In this regard, the IpsosMORI (2007, p. 7) survey cited
earlier notes that ‘…it is this fuzzy quality of Britishness that has so far allowed it to
encompass the national [Welsh, Scottish, Irish] and ethnic identities by default rather than
design.’This, of course, raises issues of ‘social cohesion’ exacerbated, forMuslims, by acts of
terrorist violence committed in the name of Islam. In particular, significant consternation has
been caused by the fact that three of the four 7/7 suicide bombers were British-born, and that
the group’s ringleaderMohammad Sidique Khan was ostensibly well-integrated into society,
along with the more recent phenomenon of British-born youth leaving Britain to join ISIS
(Ahmad 2017). For many, 2016 was a watershed year with Donald Trump’s election in the
USA and Britain’s historic Brexit decision reflecting rising nativist sentiment across Europe
and America. In 2011, then Prime Minister David Cameron popularised the term ‘muscular
liberalism’ during a well-publicised speech at an international security conference inMunich:
In the UK, some youngmen find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practiced
at home by their parents, whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern
Western countries. But these young men also find it hard to identify with Britain too,
because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine
of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives,
apart from each other and apart from the mainstream.We’ve failed to provide a vision
of society to which they feel they want to belong. (excerpt from speech by David
Cameron14; see also Heath and Demireva 2014)
Cameron’s ‘muscular liberalism’ has subsequently been operationalised in several ways. In
November 2014, the Department for Education published guidance on promoting ‘Funda-
mental British Values’ in schools—derived from the 2011 Prevent Strategy and in apparent
response to the ‘TrojanHorse’ outcry—to bemonitored through the SMSC (spiritual, moral,
social and cultural) element of Ofsted inspections; while schools were previously expected
to simply respect these values, they were now required to actively promote and demonstra-
bly embed them in pupils’ learning experiences.15 In December 2016, Dame Louise Casey
14 For a full transcript of the speech, see https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-
security-conference (accessed 3 July 2020)
15 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-promoting-british-values-in-schools-published
(accessed 3 July 2020)
0 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-casey-review-a-review-into-opportunity-and-integration
(accessed 3 July 2020)
0 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/integrated-communities-strategy-green-paper; https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-communities-action-plan (accessed 3 July 2020)
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published the findings of her review, commissioned a year earlier by the PrimeMinister and
Home Secretary, ‘into integration and opportunity in our most isolated and deprived
communities.’16 Her report was followed by an Integrated Communities Strategy Green
Paper inMarch 2018whose proposals led to anAction Plan published in February 2019 that
‘sets out the government’s next steps for building strong integrated communities… where
people – whatever their background – live, work, learn and socialise together…’.17 At the
core of these developments, it seems, lies an impulse to provide a set of values that function,
in a Durkheimian sense, as a ‘social glue’ that binds citizens together; to weld, out of an
increasingly heterogeneous assortment of source materials, a unified sense of nation.
Kwame Gyekye (1997), reflecting on the challenges faced by postcolonial
Africans grasping the nettle of self-determination, usefully distinguishes be-
tween different conceptions of nation. First, he proposes, a nation may be
conceived of as a relatively homogenous ethnocultural community bound by a
common language and history whose members share strong feelings of cohe-
sion, solidarity and belonging. This he terms N1, a simple essentially socio-
cultural phenomenon. N2, on the other hand, refers to a more complex political
entity, the multinational state, whose populace consists of numerous N1s bound
by a sovereign authority. The basic social goal of N2, claims Gyekye (1997), is
to weld the constituent N1s together under a shared rubric of national identity,
an ideal attempted through the process of nation-building: ‘Nation-building is
thus a conscious and purposive attempt to bring different peoples together to
think, act, and live as if they were one people belonging to one large
ethnocultural community, that is, as if they belonged to an N1’ (85). Nation-
building thus emerges as a type of social engineering that depends upon the
concoction—or, indeed, the ‘imagination’ (Anderson 1983)—of a unified set of
values which ostensibly capture the autochthonous cultural essence of the
majority group inhabiting the geographic boundaries of the nation state. Suc-
cessful nation-building, for Gyekye (1997), occurs when the constituent groups
of the bounded territory transfer their loyalties and commitments from the
particular to the whole, or from the specificities of their ethnocultural group
to the generality of the state. This happens through the horizontalization of the
socio-cultural features of N1 across the political entity of N2 to form a new
entity, N3. While easy to conceptualise as a normative ideal, the tangible
achievement of N3 in history has been far more elusive: ‘The conquerors
who shepherded different nationalities into nation-states failed to realize that
it is one thing to make Ghana or Kenya or Yugoslavia; it is quite another to
make Ghanaians or Kenyans or Yugoslavs’ (82).
Britain’s colonial adventures through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
were premised upon a strong, assured sense of self—fuelled by the technological achieve-
ments of the Industrial Revolution and an unabashedmoral superiority evinced, for example,
in RudyardKipling’s ‘TheWhiteMan’s Burden’—that endured even in foreign climes. The
subsequent disintegration of empire allied with pervasive processes of secularisation,
16 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-casey-review-a-review-into-opportunity-and-integration
(accessed 3 July 2020)
17 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/integrated-communities-strategy-green-paper; https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-communities-action-plan (accessed 3 July 2020)
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globalisation and a range of post-war immigration flows have, as we have seen, substantially
altered her national identity and relationship with Christianity. The establishment of numer-
ous minority groups on her shores—N1s who look, dress, eat, speak, pray and frequently
appear to think and feel differently to the majority population (Timol 2018)—have obliged
the administrators of the N2 political apparatus to confront squarely the quandary of ‘nation-
building’ previously left as a legacy for decolonised nations. Thus, the social construction of
nation becomes a political imperative. Returning to Berger and Luckmann’s tripartitemodel,
processes of externalisation and objectivation are activated as Whitehall officials determine
the presumed essence of British identity—notably, lacking any reference to her long-
standing Christian heritage—codified as a set of ‘Fundamental British Values’.18 For
Anderson, a latent sense of nationalism can be ignited with the convergence of two
factors - the presence of a clear threat, such as that experienced during World War 2, or
when the sentiments of the populace are manipulated by the state through the vehicle of
mass media, as witnessed during the Falklands War (Anderson and Ali 1991). Both factors
can today be discerned in the increasing conflation of counter-terrorism measures with the
integration agenda, as aptly demonstrated in the so-called Trojan Horse furore (Miah 2017).
For Gellner (1983), themachinery of state education enables the crucial dissemination of the
cultural idioms of national identity on a mass scale; citizens are thus produced as such
idioms are consciously embedded in core institutional repositories of the collective con-
science and internalised by pupils through processes of secondary socialisation. Yet, as we
have seen, the contents of secondary socialisation are internalised into consciousness far less
effectively than the formative substance of primary socialisation (Berger and Luckmann
1966, pp. 161–165). Put differently, Ofsted will always struggle to replace the role of the
parent.
Conclusion
In 1998, the International Sociological Association ranked The Social Construction of
Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann
as the fifth most important sociological book of the twentieth century.19 More recently,
Knott and Lee (2017, p. 13) in their wide-ranging research synthesis of over a hundred
books and articles on The Family and Ideological Transmission found that ‘Much late-
twentieth century work on social, political and religious transmission and learning drew on
18 Government guidance states that both independent and state-maintained schools ‘…have a responsibility
to ‘actively promote’ the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and
mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ (see https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/guidance-on-promoting-british-values-in-schools-published. accessed 3 July 2020). The Church of
England, reportedly, decried the omission of such Christian virtues as ‘love thy neighbour’ from this roster
(see for instance https://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2014/11/promotion-of-british-values-undermines-
christian-teaching-says-church-of-england%2D%2Dnss-responds, accessed 3 July 2020). Interestingly,
references to Christianity were similarly excised during the framing of the European Constitution at the
start of this century: ‘Though many wished to include at least a passing nod to the Christian heritage [of
European values and civilisation], others strenuously resisted even such an acknowledgement … The 70,000
words of this prolix document thus fail to include a single specific reference to Christianity’ (Jenkins 2007, pp.
38–39).
19 See http://www.isa-sociology.org/en/about-isa/history-of-isa/books-of-the-xx-century/ (accessed 3
July 2020).
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Berger and Luckmann’s theorisation of socialisation…’. Despite the enduring value of this
work, its potential to theorise the socialisation experiences of immigrants and their offspring
appears to have remained largely untapped. This article has been a first step in this direction,
with a specific focus on Muslim faith identities mediated through the British branch of the
international revivalist movement the Tablighi Jama’at.
Robinson (1988, pp. 17–18) has pointed out the irony that ‘Islamic ideas, developed
by movements which aimed to escape the consequences of British rule and Western
civilisation, have since Independence been carried by these movements to the very
heart of Britain and the West.’ Allied with the post-WW2 immigration drive from
South Asia, the Tablighi Jama’at provides an apt illustration of this. While the
movement played an important role in consolidating the faith identity of many first-
generation South Asian migrants, by functioning as a religious anchor in the new
context and catalysing a national process of mosque-building, this paper has principally
explored the cultural evolution of the movement as it has been increasingly appropri-
ated by a generation of British-born activists whose primary and secondary
socialisation experiences unfold in the UK. In doing so, it has triangulated Berger
and Luckmann’s theory of socialisation with a tripartite model of British Muslim
identity proposed by Ron Geaves.
In line with much extant work on Muslim identity in the West, the findings
recognise the increasing salience of religion for a diaspora-born generation -
particularly those affiliated with revivalist movements.20 Specifically, they de-
pict the TJ activity of khuruj—regular mosque-based retreats—as an effective
arena of ‘secondary socialisation’ where the sociological mechanics of ‘intra-
religious conversion’ are activated. Unlike the case of non-Muslim conversion
to Islam, however, the paper argues that the Tablighi Jama’at relies on
rekindling in neophyte consciousness an emotional attachment to core tenets
of the Islamic faith first internalised during the formative experience of child-
hood primary socialisation. While a level of desocialisation from the norms of
mainstream society is intrinsic to this process, exemplified through various
changes in lifestyle or dress code, the paper has simultaneously characterised
diaspora religiosity as a cultural mélange given the ongoing influence of both
ethnic ancestry and the wider British collective conscience.
In this, the findings nuance a frequent trope about revivalist movements in
contemporary Islam. To take an influential example, Roy’s (2004) thesis on
Globalised Islam argues that ‘neo-fundamentalist’ movements such as TJ repli-
cate, through processes of deculturation and deterritorialisation, the modalities
of globalisation to generate individuated forms of religious praxis rooted in an
idealised prophetic prototype. They therefore quest for a pristine Islam shorn of
cultural accretions which hearkens back to the golden age of the Prophet and
his Companions. Certainly, in some Muslim-majority contexts such as The
Gambia, the Tablighi Jama’at has functioned as a form of reformist Islam (sila
kutoo) challenging the authority of marabouts and the time-honoured legitimacy
of local Islamic customs (sila keebaa); a debate, as Janson (2014) has shown,
20 This should not obscure obverse trends of secularisation and outright apostasy which simultaneously
punctuate the landscape of British Islam with increasing prominence (see, for example, Orenstein and
Weismann 2016 or Cottee 2015).
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often hammered out on the anvil of intergenerational conflict. Yet, this reori-
entation to a sacred past does not, indeed cannot, take place in a social
vacuum. By focussing on the cultural embodiments of Tablighi activism in
the largely South Asian minority context of the UK, this paper has argued for a
fundamental continuity of identity, even as the individual undergoes multiple
resocialisations in different sub-worlds over a biographical life course. What
emerges is a hybridised bricolage that draws simultaneously on Geaves’ con-
stitutive components of British Muslim identity—religion, ethnicity and nation-
ality—and which reveals the limitations of such blanket assertions as ‘The
Tablighi behave in the same way whatever the cultural and sociological envi-
ronment, as if they were on an isolated planet’ (Roy 2004, p. 288).21
Religion, furthermore, has never existed as a set of disembodied ideals but—in line
with core principles of Berger and Luckmann’s tripartite framework—depends for its
survival upon externalisation and objectivation; that is the continual outpouring of
meanings into the world which reify over time into habits, institutions, traditions and
culture. To express this differently: the lived enaction of the metaphysical must always
be grounded in the cultural given that human beings inhabit space and time in bodies
that are continually subject to processes of socialisation.
The core philosophical substratum of Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge
lies in the proposition that the human being is essentially a biological organism upon which
processes of socialisation operate. Emerging into the world tabula rasa, the meaning-
systems he embraces as his own are actually no more than contingent chimeras that can
be bent to the will of political expediency.22 In situations of cognitive combat then, assert
Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 137), the social construction of reality may well be
determined by a broader power dynamic: ‘In other words, definitions of reality may be
enforced by the police … power in society includes the power to determine decisive
socialization processes and, therefore, the power to produce reality’. It is in this context, I
have argued, that recent attempts of the British government to promulgate a set of
21 Despite a basic uniformity of method, the Tablighi Jama’at has, in fact, proved remarkably adept at adapting
to myriad local cultures. Consider, for example Noor’s (2009, p. 48) assessment of its indigenisation in
Indonesia: ‘What began as a South Asian movement with a distinctive South Asian flavour and feel to it has
now transformed itself into a localized mode of normative religiosity that finds adherence and support from the
local population of Java … Unencumbered by ethnic and cultural attachments or the need to retain its South
Asian identity, the Tablighi has managed to spread itself from India to Europe, Africa, the Arab world and
Asia while localizing itself in each new context it finds itself in.’
22 Such a perspective, of course, flies in the face of traditional theological understandings of the human
creature rooted in the concepts of original sin (Christianity), reincarnation (Buddhism) or the fitra (Islam).
From the perspective of the sociology of knowledge, such conceptualisations must be bracketed as they are not
amenable to empirical investigation (cf. Berger’s (1967, p. 100) concept of ‘methodological atheism’ but also
its critique by Porpora (2006)). Interestingly, however, the power of socialisation to construct worlds of
meaning entirely taken-for-granted in subjective consciousness was intuited by the celebrated Muslim
theologian Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in his intellectual autobiography 900 years ago: ‘…the fetters of servile
conformism fell away from me, and inherited beliefs lost their hold on me, when I was still quite young. For I
saw that the children of Christians always grew up embracing Christianity, and the children of Jews always
grew up adhering to Judaism, and the children of Muslims always grew up following the religion of Islam. I
also heard the tradition related from the Apostle of God – God’s blessing and peace be upon him! – in which
he said: ‘Every infant is born endowed with the fitra then his parents make him Jew or Christian or Magian.’
Consequently, I felt an inner urge to seek the true meaning of the original fitra, and the true meanings of the
beliefs arising through slavish aping of parents and teachers’ (McCarthy 2000, pp. 19–20). Ibn Tufayl’s
exploration of this theme in his classic work Hayy ibn Yaqzan is also relevant (Goodman 2009 [2003]).
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fundamental British values through schools should be understood. Drawing on the work of
Kwame Gyekye, I have suggested that—especially in light of weakened national and
religious identities intensified by multiple immigration flows—the quandary of ‘nation-
building’ previously left as a legacy for decolonised nations has now become a peculiarly
home-grown problem. A myth of fundamentalist Britishness thus emerges as an anchor of
identity whichmirrors, in several important ways, the myth of pure Islam to which revivalist
groups ostensibly aspire.
Such myths however are always unattainable in the concrete matrixes of real life.
This article has argued for example that the subtle residues of ethnic culture, rooted in
consciousness during the powerful formative experience of primary socialisation,
cannot easily be disavowed but continue to manifest themselves in such foundational
impulses of the diaspora-born Muslim as the proclivities of the palate, an instinctive
gesture of deference offered when greeting a family elder or in failing a hypothetical
version of Lord Tebbit’s ‘cricket test’ by supporting Pakistan over Saudi Arabia.
Further, the religiosity of a diaspora-born generation cannot but develop symbiotically
or dialectically—depending on the particular tendency—with the broader social milieu
in which it is actualised. Consequently, new forms of hybridised Islam (and, indeed,
national culture) emerge that draw upon the cultural repertoires of the social arenas in
which the British-born generation’s secondary socialisations occur, not least the wider
cultural emphasis on individualisation noted earlier. Several publications exemplify
this shift including, notably, Janmohamed’s (2016) vivacious capturing of ‘Generation
M’, Imtiaz’s (2011) ruminations on ‘the Muslim condition in the West’ and Herding’s
(2013) descriptions of an emergent ‘conservative avant-garde’ among Islamic youth
cultures in France, Britain and Germany. While this paper has focussed on the
experiences of British-born Tablighis, I would maintain that the findings transcend this
immediate empirical setting, and in line with this broader corpus of literature, reflect
processes of cultural indigenisation operative in British Islam more generally.
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